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In late November, 1975, the University of Maryland School of
Law, in association with the Schools of Medicine of the University
of Maryland and The Johns Hopkins University, held a two-day
conference on "The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Managing the Costs."
The conference was interdisciplinary - the participants were specialists
in law, medicine, insurance, economics, and sociology. Papers on
various topics were presented to the conference, followed by intensive
discussion of the questions they raised. Several of those papers are
published in this issue of the Maryland Law Review. No summary
of two days of analysis can accurately reflect the thrust and flavor
of all the views expressed. This essay attempts, however, to explore
the wide range of issues that were analyzed at the conference.
During the last two years, almost every state legislature has
enacted one or more measures dealing with medical malpractice.1 The
battle still rages in most of these legislatures and before state insurance
commissioners over reform of law and practice in this area. Although
the process of reform began with an indignant roar from the medical
profession over the cost of medical malpractice insurance, other groups
with varying interests have since entered the picture. Underlying all
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A.B., 1967 Indiana
University; J.D., 1971 Yale University.
1. See S. GROSSMAN, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS: STATE LEGISLATIVE
ACTIVITIES IN 1975 (National Center For Health Services Research document, Oct.
1975) ; Medical Malpractice and the State Legislatures (Monthly newsletter of the
National Conference of State Legislatures, Apr., May, June, July & Aug. 1976);
Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses To The Medical Malpractice
Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417 [hereinafter cited as State Legislative Responses].
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suggestions for reform are differing assumptions about the defects
that exist in the current system and about the proper objectives of
reform. The pressure of debate has not always allowed clarification
of these assumptions or dispassionate analysis of the possible impact
of proposed changes. Because only some of the proposals for reform
are fully developed, and because the effects of those that have been
enacted into law are only beginning to surface, such an analysis must
necessarily be incomplete. An assessment at this preliminary stage
may nevertheless be useful.
I. THE CONTEXT
The number of medical malpractice claims and the average amount
paid in settlement or judgment of them' have increased dramatically
during recent years.' Many factors are cited to explain this phenome-
non: a weakening of physician-patient relationships caused by grow-
ing medical specialization;4 a loss of trust and confidence in the medical
profession by the consumers of health care;' the double-digit inflation
which occurred during part of this period;' and court-created modifi-
cations of the law that have expanded the group of persons entitled
to recovery." The increase in the number and severity of claims has,
2. The amount paid to a claimant in a settlement or by judgment is known as
the "severity" of the claim.
3. For reference to the experience of the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company, one of the nation's major underwriters of medical malpractice insurance, see
BUREAU OF INS., STATE CORP. COMM'N (Virginia), MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
IN VIRGINIA: THE SCOPE AND SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as VIRGINIA REPORT]. The frequency of claims made
against physicians insured by St. Paul rose 139 percent between 1968 and 1974; the
average severity of claims rose 117 percent during the same period. These figures do
not include claims in New York and California, where St. Paul does not write medical
malpractice insurance.
4. See Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge of and Attitudes Toward Modical Mal-
practice in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACtIICE (Appendix) 658, 666-67 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT]; Mechanic, Some Social Aspects
of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1183.
5. See Mechanic, supra note 4, at 1186.
6. See R. Rosett, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis [paper presented
to a University of Maryland Law School Conference entitled The Medical Malpractice
Crisis: Managing the Costs (hereinafter cited as Maryland Conference) November
21, 1975, on file with the Maryland Law Review].
7. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MALPRACTICE IN Focus 27 (source
document prepared by the editors of PRISM, Aug. 1975).
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of course, led to a series of increases in medical malpractice liability
insurance premiums.
Another factor complicates the problem. Increases in the number
and severity of claims have been occurring at unpredicted (and prob-
ably unpredictable) rates.8 It is therefore difficult for companies
writing medical malpractice liability insurance to fix accurate prices
for the future protection that they sell to physicians. One way to
avoid the risk of inadequate pricing is to fix premium rates so high
that they are certain to be adequate. Another is to withdraw from
the market, possibly leaving physicians without access to insurance
coverage. Both have occurred during recent years.
A further factor, which had always been present but was more
clearly recognized as the insurance "crisis" materialized, is that medi-
cal malpractice claims are expensive to resolve. Often factually and
technically complex, they require extensive pretrial discovery and con-
siderable time on the part of counsel and expert witnesses in all stages
of litigation. Consequently, a comparatively small portion of the
malpractice premium dollar finds its way into the pocket of the success-
ful claimant. The rest is consumed by the administrative and legal
costs of resolving claims.9
Literally hundreds of proposals have been made for dealing with
these problems. For convenience of analysis, they may be divided
into four categories. First, some insurance reforms aim at rendering
the risk of suffering a malpractice claim more easily insurable by
adjusting the type of coverage that is sold to the insuring physician.
Another goal of certain insurance reform proposals is to spread the
cost of insuring against claims more uniformly among physicians
either by altering premium classification structures or by compensating
patients out of a public fund for damages above a specified ceiling.
Second, tort law modifications are aimed at either reducing the num-
ber of persons entitled to bring malpractice actions or limiting the
amount that is recoverable in these claims. A third focal point of
proposals for reform is the dispute resolution mechanism. Medical
8. See Roddis & Stewart, The Insurance of Medical Losses, 1975 DUKE L.J.
1281, 1292; SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 4, at 41-42.
9. For estimates of the portion of the premium dollar which is actually paid to
patients, see PHYSICIANS CRisis COMMITTEE [of Detroit], CouRT DocKEr SURVEY 2
(1975) ; O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault
Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv. 501, 506-09 (1976) ; Note,
Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141,
1155 (1975); SuBcomM. ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS.; MEDICAL MALICTICE: THE
PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN 10 (Comm. Print 1969).
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review boards, screening panels, and arbitration are all devices that
might help to resolve medical malpractice claims in a more reliable,
less costly, and less time-consuming manner than under the current
system. Finally, new compensation systems have the potential of
promoting a number of positive effects. Channelling liability through
hospitals instead of through physicians, for example, might create new
financial incentives on the part of hospitals to avoid malpractice within
their walls. Another approach, no-fault compensation for medical
injuries, would provide compensation to more people than are cur-
rently able to collect. In addition, a no-fault system might be struc-
tured to increase physicians' incentives to avoid certain adverse out-
comes of medical treatment.
These reforms, of course, focus on different "defects" in the exist-
ing system, and are based on varying premises about the nature of the
medical malpractice problem. The truth of some of these premises has
not been convincingly demonstrated. Consequently, the following
analysis will concentrate on both the underlying assumptions and the
probable impact of each approach to reform.
II. INSURABILITY
A. The Claims-Made Policy
The longer the period covered by a particular insurance policy,
the greater is the difficulty of predicting future claims and of fixing
an accurate price for the coverage provided. This is especially true
when, as in recent medical malpractice experience, current change
appears to portend unpredictable change in the future. Until recently,
medical malpractice liability insurance policies were written with rela-
tively long periods of coverage. These policies protected the insured
against claims arising from any treatment provided during the policy
year, regardless of when the claim was made. Claims relating to
treatment provided under this "occurrence" form of coverage can be
made and paid years after issuance. This phenomenon is known as
the "long-tail" effect; it is in part the result of certain exceptions to
statutes of limitations"° and the length of time between the filing of a
claim and its resolution. Because of these uncertainties it is possible
that the cost of all the claims attributable to a given treatment year
may be unknown until years later. Thus, in order to set a price for
occurrence coverage, insurance companies must predict the social and
economic inflation in claims and recoveries that may occur between
10. See text accompanying notes 35 to 39 supra.
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the issuance of the policy and the last date when a claim covered by it
may be resolved.
Recently, however, there has been a shift toward use of "claims-
made" coverage, under which the policy holder is insured only against
claims made during the policy year, regardless of when the treatment
out of which the claim arises was provided. Claims-made coverage is
designed to avoid some of the difficulties posed by the "long-tail" in
medical malpractice insuring. By insuring only against claims made
within a year from the date a policy is issued, insurance companies
reduce the need to predict increases in claim frequency and severity.
Although this pricing system may be more accurate, it is not without
its drawbacks. In pricing occurrence coverage, insurance companies
had the burden of planning for the long term. Under a claims-made
system, however, much of the risk of planning for the uncertain future
is shifted from the insurer to the insured.
For example, the physician maintaining occurrence coverage
knows that once he retires or ceases to practice, the policies he pur-
chased in the past will provide him with complete -coverage against any
future claims. In contrast, the retired physician who practiced with
claims-made insurance must continue to purchase yearly policies after
he ceases treating patients and earning money to pay for premiums.
He will therefore be wise to invest funds during his active life to
finance the purchase of insurance coverage after retirement. Yet he
will have great difficulty predicting what the amount of this investment
should be. This is exactly the problem that has caused insurance
companies to shift from occurrence to claims-made coverage. Thus,
the claims-made approach not only shifts the risk that future claims
experience will differ from current predictions; it also shifts to the
individual physician the burden of investing funds in anticipation of
future premiums.
Another result of the move to claims-made coverage may be a
fundamental change in the group of persons ultimately bearing the
cost of insuring. Assuming that a sizeable portion of a physician's
premiums are ultimately paid by his patients, then under an occurrence
policy those treated shortly before and during the year for which
the policy covers the physician, will finance that policy." Thus, the
11. Whether the patients treated in the years before or in the year during which
coverage is in effect actually bear this cost will depend on the physician's ability to
save funds during the previous year for payment of the next year's premium and on
his ability to predict what that premium will be. To the extent that the physician
does not increase his charges as malpractice premiums increase, then he and his patients
from years past finance the insurance.
1977]
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cost of insuring patients against malpractice will be paid largely by
those patients themselves. In contrast, under the claims-made approach,
unless a physician is able to set aside funds sufficient to pay future
premiums, each year's patients will pay for insurance against malpractice
committed in years past. This change represents a subtle shift from
a near full-cost imposition on those purchasing the service to a "pay
as you go" approach resembling the financing of social security in-
surance. The effect of this shift is to transfer part of the incentive to
confront the system's current problems from the present to the future,
when the cost of dealing with the problems of predicting claims ex-
perience may have greatly increased and our ability to deal with them
may have diminished.
B. Patient Compensation Funds
Medical malpractice liability insurance premiums are set with refer-
ence to several risk categories. These categories are based on the
medical specialties. Normally there are five or six classes within each
state, varying from the lowest risk class (the general practitioner who
performs no surgery), to the highest risk class (the neurosurgeon or
orthopedic surgeon). The difference between the premiums paid by
the two classes can be enormous. 12 Several states have dealt with this
disparity by imposing ceilings on the liability of health care providers
for malpractice while establishing Patient Compensation Funds to pay
claimants the excess of awards or settlements beyond the ceiling.13
Depending on the manner in which the fund is financed, a number of
objectives can be achieved by this device. If the fund were financed
out of general state revenues, then the ceiling would relieve health
care providers of the risk of unpredictable increases in claims severity.
A difficulty with this approach, however, is that the fund would operate
much like an insurance company writing claims-made insurance since
it would assess taxes based on each year's expected pay-outs. Tax-
payers would then be subjected to a burden similar to that of the
physician covered by a claims-made policy. If the fund is maintained
by assessments paid by health care providers (as are the funds created
12. St. Paul's rates as of January 1, 1975 for basic minimum coverage ($100,000/
$300,000) in Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia were as follows: Mary-
land - class 1 (low risk), $360, class 5 (high risk), $2273; Virginia - class 1, $433,
class 5, $2728; District of Columbia - class 1, $599, class 5, $3790. See VIRGINIA
REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
13. See, e.g., FA. STAT. ANN. § 627.353 (West Supp. 1976-1977) ; ch. 796, § 14
1975 Ore. Laws Spec. Sess. 2315.
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thus far), the method of assessing becomes critical. A uniform assess-
ment against all providers would adjust the differential premiums now
paid by providers in high risk classes; differentials would exist only
in connection with below-ceiling liability insurance. But where assess-
ments are levied on the basis of risk criteria similar to those now used
by the commercial insurers, 14 there is no levelling of premium dif-
ferentials. In such cases the apparent function of the fund is to assure
the health care profession that insurance against high recoveries will
be available.
III. TORT LAW MODIFICATIONS
Changes in forms of insurance coverage would alter the manner
in which the risk of suffering a medical malpractice claim is insured
against. In contrast, modification of doctrines in the law of torts would
reduce the scope of that risk. Attempts at reducing claim exposure
have taken two forms: first, rules of law have been modified so that
the number of persons entitled to make a claim is reduced; second, the
amount that may be recovered has been limited.
Evaluation of proposed and enacted modifications of the law on
an individual basis is especially difficult in this area. Most of the con-
troversial doctrines arose in response to what were considered serious
inequities in the tort system. In many cases, these inequities will arise
again if the doctrines are eliminated. Although critics often refer to
abuses in specific cases, the arguments for extensive alteration of any
particular doctrine are not convincing. Hence, the impression that
emerges after a survey of the arguments for change in this area is that
dissatisfaction with the legal system lies not with any particular doc-
trine, but with the overall balance of advantage between potential plain-
tiffs and defendants. It may be useful, therefore, to evaluate briefly
the proposals for change of some of the more prominent doctrines that
arise in medical malpractice cases. Following this evaluation, by focus-
ing on the relationship between judge and jury in medical malpractice
cases, I will attempt to illuminate some of the criticisms of the medical
malpractice liability system's overall operation that seem to be implicit
in these attacks on individual doctrines.
14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.353(2) (c) (West Supp. 1976-1977), which
provides, inter alia, for a uniform assessment in the first year of the fund's operation,
followed by an assessment after the first year based on:
"1. Past and prospective loss and expense experience in different types of
practice and in different geographical areas within the state;




A. Reducing the Number of Persons Entitled to Recover
1) Expert Witnesses and Locality Rule
One of the critical features of almost all medical malpractice
cases is the presentation of expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff.15
The defendant's conduct is measured by a standard that is normally
inaccessible to the jury in the absence of expert testimony: the skill
and learning commonly possessed by members of the profession in good
standing.6 For many years the standard of skill and learning was
established by reference to those physicians who practiced in the
geographical locality of the defendant."i Only a physician practicing
in that locality could qualify as an expert on the standard. The under-
standable reluctance of physicians to testify against a colleague - the
"conspiracy of silence" - was thought by many to be a major obstacle
to making a successful claim. Reacting to this phenomenon, some
courts held that physicians who had familiarized themselves with the
standards of the relevant locality could qualify as experts even though
they did not themselves practice there.18 In addition, the growing
nationalization in the character of standards of medical care caused
courts to enlarge the relevant locality. It often became statewide and,
in some cases and specialties, nationwide.19 The number of physicians
capable of testifying concerning the appropriate standard of care there-
fore increased, as did the number. of cases that could be won despite a
"conspiracy of silence" by a defendant's local colleagues.
Dissatisfaction with abolition of the locality rule seems to be
twofold. First, many physicians are genuinely outraged by the exist-
ence of what they term "hired guns" - physicians who devote a large
portion of their careers to testifying in malpractice cases. This repre-
sents dissatisfaction with the fact of such a person testifying as to the
standard of care, rather than with the standard itself. That a physi-
cian spends much of his time as a witness does not itself seem suffi-
15. For a discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which enables the presen-
tation of certain cases without the support of expert testimony, see text accompanying
notes 29 to 34 infra.
16. See 2 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 969 (1956); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 162 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER,
TORTS ].
17. .See W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 16, at 164.
18. See. e.g.. Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1953).
See geierally Comment. Medical Malpractice - Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. R.v.
834 (1966).
19. See. e.g.. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349
A.2d 245 (1975) (holding that Maryland does not apply the locality rule).
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cient reason for his disqualification as an expert. So long as he
possesses expertise in the relevant field, his testimony should be ad-
missible. Normally, of course, that expertise should be demonstrated by
the maintenance of a substantial (though not necessarily full-time)
practice in the field. There is no evidence available as to the extent
of testimony by "hired guns," or, for that matter, as to the qualifications
of all the physicians who testify in malpractice cases. If physicians
who are not sufficiently familiar with the standards of practice are
frequently being qualified as experts, then a statutory standard re-
quiring potential experts to devote a minimum portion of their time
to actual practice might be appropriate. In the absence of proof that there
is widespread use of unqualified experts, the trial judge's discretion to
bar testimony by a potential witness whose qualifications are not demon-
strated should suffice to control attempted abuses."0
The second argument for restoring the locality rule is more basic.
The movement to state or national standards of care may require that
certain physicians conform their practices to higher standards. This
may necessitate not only change in patterns of physician conduct, but
also increases in the resources that must be made available to physicians
and hospitals.21 This might create hardships in certain situations, but
the general availability of medical literature, post-graduate education,
and of national accreditation of hospitals would seem to justify holding
physicians and hospitals to minimum national standards. The alter-
native would be to deprive some communities of the quality of care




In a growing number of cases a claimant has been allowed recovery
on the ground that the defendant physician failed to obtain the plain-
tiff's "informed" consent to undergo a procedure involving a risk of
a harm which the patient in fact later suffered. 23 The issue in most
20. For a discussion of the discretion of the trial court in determining the quali-
fications of proposed experts see 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 561 (3d ed. 1940).
21. The extent to which the resources available to physicians and hospitals may
be taken into account in evaluating their conduct varies. Compare Shilkret v. Annapolis
Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975), with Brune v. Belinkoff,
354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
22. For a discussion of the sense in which quality standards may result in the
provision of "excess" care, see Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost
Trade-Offs In Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6, 25-30 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972) ; Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972). See also discussions in Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Con-
19771 497
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of these cases is the reasonableness of the physician's failure to disclose
the risk in question. The trend seems to be to test the reasonableness
of the decision not to disclose by asking whether a reasonable patient
would have desired to know the undisclosed information prior to his
deciding whether to consent to treatment.24 Critics of the doctrine
point out that there are both theoretical and practical difficulties in
applying it. Because a retrospective determination that the patient
would have consented to the procedure had the risk been disclosed is
of questionable accuracy, the causal connection between failure to
disclose and subsequent injury is suspect.2 5 There is also a strong
argument that the claimant's damages should be offset against the loss
or injury he would have suffered by refusing treatment. Professor
Richard Epstein has recently argued that the physician's liability
should be limited to those situations in which he has failed to make
disclosures that the standards of the profession require.2 6 Despite the
troublesome problems posed by the doctrine as it now stands, such
a limitation on the doctrine would be unwise. The effect of the
limitation would be to vest in the medical profession total discretion to
determine what a patient needs to know in order to undergo treatment.
Although the custom of the profession may be strong evidence of what
tract, 1976 AM. BAR FoUN. RES. J. 87, 119-28; Shartsis, Informed Consent: Some
Problems Revisited, 51 NEB. L. REv. 527 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed
Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970). Although reliance on the doctrine
may be increasing, the nature of the available data makes comparison between past
and current experience difficult. One study analyzed 3699 appellate malpractice cases
decided between 1950 and 1971. Over that period, informed consent was the most
significant issue in only 72 of these cases. Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Mal-
practice Legal System, SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT (Appendix), supra note 4,
at 147. A survey of claims closed in 1974, however, found that failure to obtain
informed consent was alleged or was the basis of a claim's disposition in 13 percent
of the claims surveyed. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, SPECIAL MALPRACTICE REVIEW:
1974 CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 31 (Dec.
1, 1975) [hereinafter cited as ISO SURVEY]. Because the former survey deals with
the most significant issue in appellate cases, and the latter with allegations in all closed
claims, definitive comparison cannot be made.
24. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972)
("Materiality may be said to be the significance a reasonable person, in what the
physician knows or should know is his patient's position, would attach to the disclosed
risk or risks in deciding whether to submit or not to submit to surgery or treatment.") ;
Cf. W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 16, at 165-66 (standards of professional conduct).
25. One suggestion for dealing with this problem of proof is to avoid putting
the physician "at the mercy of his patient's hindsight" by posing the issue in terms of
the effect that disclosure would have had on the "reasonable" person in the plaintiff's
position. See Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV.
628, 646-47 (1970).
26. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. BAR FOUN.
REs. J. 87, 120.
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disclosures are appropriate, there will be occasions when it should not
be conclusive.
The existence of the doctrine of informed consent not only seems
to have encouraged physicians to procure consent, but has also im-
proved communication between physician and patient. Publicity in
medical journals and word of mouth have familiarized many physicians
with leading cases. Physicians admit to spending more time and
effort than they did in the past in explaining to patients the risks of
treatment and in helping patients understand the alternatives." Perhaps
as important as the securing of informed consent are the collateral
benefits of this increased communication between physicians and pa-
tients. For example, the sharing of information may create a positive
relationship with the patient that discourages the bringing of a mal-
practice action on other grounds.28  In short, despite its weaknesses,
the doctrine advances two important ends: it encourages the physician
to keep the patient informed and it protects the patient's control over
the treatment he receives.
3) Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been used in medical cases
where 1) it is unlikely that the injury in question would have occurred
in the absence of negligence and 2) the injury has been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the de-
fendant.29 When applicable, res ipsa loquitur eliminates the need for
the plaintiff to prove a specific act of malpractice. This is an important
function; it enables a claimant's case to reach the jury when it is
likely that malpractice has occurred, although direct evidence
of malpractice is unavailable. It is important to stress that res ipsa
loquitur may be applied in only a narrow class of cases: those in
which, among other things, the patient's injury would not ordinarily
have occurred in the absence of negligence.8 0 Further, most states
27. This conclusion is based in part on my discussions with physicians and obser-
vation of their behavior in the course of the study described in K. Abraham, Life In
A Hospital and The Feasibility of No-Fault, (paper presented to the Maryland Con-
ference, supra note 6, on file with the Maryland Law Review).
28. For speculation concerning the effect of the physician-patient relationship
on the incidence of malpractice claims, see Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge of and
Attitudes Toward Medical Malpractice, SEcRmrEuT's ComMIssioN REPORT (Appendix),
supra note 4, at 667.
29. 2 F. HARPRa & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS 1085 (1956); W. PRoSSER,
TORTS, supra note 16, at 214. See generally Comment, The Application of Res Ipsa
Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Cases, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 852 (1966).
30. See Brown v. Keaveny, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 117, 326 F.2d 660 (1963).
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apply the doctrine only where the presumed causal connection between
the claimant's injury and an act of malpractice is a matter of common
knowledge.8' Only a few jurisdictions admit testimony by an expert
that the injury in question does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
malpractice.32 Thus, the number of cases in which the doctrine may
be applied is limited.3 3
Suggestions for reform of the use of res ipsa loquitur have focused
on specifying the situations in which the doctrine would apply. 34 Criti-
cism of the doctrine is thus implicitly directed at the exercise of dis-
cretion by the judiciary in applying it, rather than at the theory of
the doctrine itself. The problem with the specification approach is
obvious: it limits judicial discretion to apply the doctrine to claims
that do not fall within a specified category. Any doctrine, of course,
can be misused, but a limitation on the use of res ipsa loquitur in
medical cases that is more exacting than the current requirements
could be especially harsh. In medical cases the claimant is likely to
be peculiarly unable to reconstruct the chain of events leading to his
injury - he is often unconscious, and impartial witnesses are not
easily obtained. Moreover, the complexity of medical conditions and
incompleteness of medical knowledge, the same factors that militate
31. See D. LouIsFLL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
206-07 (Supp. 1975); W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 16, at 227; Comment, The Appli-
cation of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Cases, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 852
(1966).
32. See, e.g., Raza v. Sullivan, 432 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Tomei v. Henning,
67 Cal. 2d 319, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9, 431 P.2d 633 (1967) ; Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1,
121 N.W.2d 255 (1963).
33. Applicability of res ipsa loquitur was the most significant issue in 189 of the
3717 appellate cases decided between 1950 and 1971 surveyed in Dietz, Baird & Berul,
The Medical Malpractice Legal System, SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT (Appen-
dix), supra note 4, at 142. At the trial level, the doctrine formed the basis of allega-
tions in only 8 percent of the 1974 closed claims surveyed in another study. ISO
SURVEY, supra note 23, at 31.
34. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. § 41A.100 (1975), creating a "rebuttable presump-
tion" of negligence where one or more of the following has occurred:
1) A foreign substance other than medication or a prosthetic device was un-
intentionally left within the body of a patient following surgery;
2) An explosion or fire originating in a substance used in treatment occurred
in the course of treatment;
3) An unintended burn caused by heat, radiation or chemicals was suffered
in the course of medical care;
4) An injury was suffered during the course of treatment to a part of the
body not directly involved in such treatment or proximate thereto; or
5) A surgical procedure was performed on the wrong patient or the wrong
organ, limb or part of a patient's body.
See also Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract; 1976 Am. BAR FouN.
REs. J. 87, 138-41.
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against application of the doctrine in cases where it is impossible to
identify the cause of a patient's injury, suggest that specifying situa-
tions in which res ipsa loquitur can be applied may exclude many
claims in which application of the doctrine would be appropriate. This
is a high price to pay to ensure that an uncertain (but probably small)
number of cases in which res ipsa should not apply are eliminated.
4) Statutes of Limitations
Another feature of the tort system that has been criticized during
the recent controversy is related to statutes of limitations on the bringing
of malpractice actions. These statutes limit the period during which
a claimant may initiate suit. Shortening this period may accomplish
some objectives, but it is important to recognize that the overall
impact of this reform will be limited.
As pointed out above,35 medical malpractice liability is complicated
by a phenomenon known as the "long-tail" effect, i.e., there may be a
long period between medical treatment and the final resolution of all
claims made in connection with that treatment. The length of the tail
is determined by several factors. Medical malpractice claims may be
more complex than the average tort claim, requiring more time for
all aspects of litigation,36 and thus the length of time from filing of a
suit to final resolution is likely to be greater. Altering statutes of
limitations would have no effect on these factors because they affect only
the time from filing to resolution.
Nevertheless, changes in the statutes of limitations might shorten
the portion of the long tail that corresponds to the period between the
occurrence of the incident in question and the filing of suit. This
interval occasionally exceeds the period of the statute of limitations
because of two exceptions. The first exception pertains to the patient's
discovery of malpractice. Courts in many jurisdictions have held that
the statutory period for bringing a claim does not begin to run until
the claimant discovers (or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have discovered) the alleged malpractice.3 7 In the typical personal
35. See text accompanying note 10 supra; SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 4, at 42.
36. SECRETARY'S CommissION REPORT, supra note 4, at 42.
37. See, e.g., Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450
(1970); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969). The statute may also
be tolled where there has been fraudulent concealment of error by the physician or
where the physician continues to provide treatment after the injury but fails to discover
his error. See State Legislative Responses, supra note 1, at 1430-32.
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injury claim the fact of the injury often quite painfully gives a poten-
tial plaintiff notice that he may have a claim. In contrast, since even
properly performed medical procedures may entail physical discomfort,
the period between injury and discovery may be lengthy. A number
of states have recently enacted legislation repealing the discovery ex-
ception in whole or in part.8
A second exception to statutes of limitations applies to minors
and other persons under a legal disability. In most states the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the injured party reaches
the age of majority or the disability is removed. In some instances,
the "tail" on claims relating to treatment provided in a particular
year may exceed twenty years. The procedural explanation for this
exception is the incapacity of such persons to bring suit in their own
name. A more substantive justification that might be offered, however,
is that the effects of medical injuries to minors may take a number of
years to emerge, either because of maturational phenomena or because
of a child's inability to articulate his complaints. Several recent amend-
ments to state statutes of limitations appear to have taken account of
this possibility. 9
Whether these limitations on the exception for minors and persons
under a disability are justifiable is unclear. There is greater justifica-
tion for restricting this exception than for restricting the exception
for undiscovered injuries. This is because there is normally someone
on whom responsibility could be placed for bringing an action on behalf
of a minor or disabled person within the limitation period, whereas
no one can be blamed for failing to bring an action for an undiscovered
injury. Alteration of the minority and disability exceptions might,
therefore, penalize a small group: those whose parents or legal guardians
through negligence or inadvertence fail to initiate claims within the
allotted time. On the other hand, such an alteration could cause the
earlier initiation of cases that are currently delayed because of a strategic
decision to postpone filing in order to take advantage of possible social
and economic inflation. It would be interesting to learn what portion
of the "late" claims filed by minors are the result of strategic delay.
If most of these claims are late because of a deliberate decision to
postpone filing rather than because of parental carelessness, it might
be worthwhile to sacrifice the occasional claim by a minor whose
38. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
39. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns Supp. 1976); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 2305.11 (B) (Page Supp. 1975), which toll the statutes in these states only until
minors reach the age of six and ten respectively.
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parents had carelessly failed to initiate suit during the statutory
period.40
Even if the only effect of modification of statutes of limitations
is to change the pattern of claim reporting so that all claims are
known earlier, prediction of total claim exposure may be somewhat
facilitated. In assessing the wisdom of further curtailing these tradi-
tional exceptions, however, it should be noted that untimely claims
have contributed only slightly to the unpredictability that has troubled
the industry. One recent study found that 98.1 percent of all incidents,
involving 98.3 percent of all award dollars, are reported within five
years of their occurrence. 4' In short, although the tail is long, it may
not be very wide.2
B. Reducing the Severity of Claims
Rather than reducing burgeoning costs by limiting the number
of persons entitled to recover, a second approach would focus on limiting
the average amount recovered by all claimants. Like the limitations on
the numbers of persons entitled to recover, however, these devices are
based upon certain assumptions about defects in the system that re-
quire scrutiny.
1) Ceilings on the Amount of Recovery
An obvious way to limit the cost of medical malpractice insurance
and to make more reliable the predictions necessary for accurate pricing
is to place a ceiling on the amount recoverable. A ceiling can be
fashioned in several ways. A statutory maximum can be set on the
40. Elimination or narrowing of the discovery, minority, and legal disability
exceptions may also ameliorate a problem related to increases in award levels be-
tween the time of the incident and final claim resolution. Where this period is lengthy,
the value of a claim may exceed the limits of the standard occurrence policy that was
issued during the treatment year in question. Since most medical malpractice liability
insurance until 1975 was occurrence coverage, this problem could exist for years to
come. If claims-made coverage becomes standard, the problem will begin to recede,
since the policy limits will be set to take account of recent award levels. In the in-
terim, "prior-acts" coverage insuring physicians against judgments above past occur-
rence policy limits could provide protection. The industry apparently does not offer
such coverage at present.
41. See ISO SURVEY, supra note 23, at 25-26.
42. Some claims recently made by persons injured when they were minors may
have been delayed because of pessimism about the possibility of recovery at the time
of injury. See 1R Rosett, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, supra note 6.
Perceived expansion in the right to recover (e.g., because of dissipation of the "con-
spiracy of silence") may therefore account for a portion of the current "late" claims.




amount recoverable by a claimant either from an individual defendant 43
or from all defendants in a particular claim." Other variations might
limit the amount of general or special damages recoverable.
Ceilings impose the full cost of .limiting malpractice awards on
those who would otherwise recover damages in excess of the ceiling.
A ceiling might be justified if it could be demonstrated that high awards
have exceeded the amount of damages suffered by their recipients,
but there does not seem to be any conclusive evidence regarding this
proposition. Since a significant portion of large awards constitutes
general damages for "pain and suffering" - a rather subjective item -
evaluation of the accuracy of such awards is difficult. Nor is there
evidence that smaller awards are more accurate than larger ones.
Until there is such evidence, the purported inaccuracy of large awards
cannot justify the imposition of ceilings.
Another argument occasionally made in support of ceilings is
simply that society cannot afford the payment of damages above a
specified sum. Assuming that the claimant has actually suffered above-
ceiling losses, this argument is unpersuasive. Failing to compensate
a victim for a portion of his losses does not eliminate their cost - it
simply imposes the cost on the victim. Moreover, if it is appropriate
for the victims of medical malpractice to bear a portion of their losses,
it is difficult to discern why it is not equally appropriate for the victims
of other professional negligence - or negligence in general - to bear
a portion of their losses. In short, a convincing case for differential
treatment of medical malpractice awards has not been made.
2) The Collateral Source Rule
According to a traditional rule of tort law, the damages recoverable
by the plaintiff for personal injuries may not be reduced by the amount
of payments received from collateral sources such as insurance bene-
fits.4" Several arguments have been advanced in support of the rule."
First, it is said that the plaintiff is in effect penalized for having pur-
43. See IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4204 to 4205 (Supp. 1975).
44. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976-1977) (setting
the maximum recovery for a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action at $500,000);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2.2 (Burns Supp. 1976) ($100,000 limitation; excess up to
$500,000 recoverable from Patient Compensation Fund).
45. The earliest cases to apply the rule seem to be The Propeller Monticello v.
Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854) and Althorpe v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355 (1840).
See Moceri & Messina, The Collateral Source Rule In Personal Injury Litigation,
7 GONZAGA L. REV. 310 (1972); Note, Unreason In The Law of Damages: The
Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv. L. REV. 741 (1964).




chased insurance. Second, it is predicted that applying insurance pro-
ceeds against damage awards will discourage the purchase of insurance
coverage. Third, proponents of the rule fear that reduction in de-
fendants' liability will diminish the deterrent effect of liability. Under
close analysis, none of these traditional arguments is persuasive. The
plaintiff is not truly penalized for having purchased insurance; rather,
he gets just what he bargained for - certainty of payment. Nor is
the purchase of insurance likely to be discouraged. Most first party
insurance coverage that compensates for medical malpractice injuries
covers a much wider range of events than those for which recovery
could be obtained in a tort action (e.g., health, life, and disability in-
surance). Therefore, such insurance will probably be purchased re-
gardless of the status of the collateral source rule. In addition, the
elimination of the rule will probably have little effect on the deterrence
of medical negligence. Since in many instances payments from col-
lateral sources will constitute much less than half the damages suffered
by a plaintiff, a financial threat will still exist." Furthermore, the other
forces that encourage physicians to exercise care and skill, such as the
adverse publicity accompanying litigation and the possibility of peer
group disciplinary action, will continue to be at work even if the rule
is eliminated.4"
The rule could be modified in several ways. By simply abolishing
it, evidence of collateral source payments would be admissible and jurors
could decide for themselves by what amount, if any, to reduce damages.
A better method would be to require the reduction of damages pro tanto
so that all parties receive uniform treatment with respect to collateral
sources. Once the "double recovery" for the plaintiff is denied, the bene-
fit could be passed on either to defendant (or his insurance carrier) in
the form of a reduced judgment or to the plaintiff's collateral sources.
If the judgment that the defendant's insurer must pay is reduced by
the amount of collateral source payments, physicians and their patients
will benefit through reduced (or less drastically increased) medical
malpractice insurance premiums. If, on the other hand, a portion of
the judgment equal to the collateral source payments received or
receivable by plaintiff is reimbursed to those sources, then the ultimate
beneficiaries are those who purchase this type of insurance. Neverthe-
less, the cost of transferring these funds to collateral sources hardly
47. See James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative
Remedies 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 537, 548-50 (1952) ; O'Connell, An Alternative To
Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance For Many Kinds of Injuries,
60 MINN. L. REv. 501, 505 n.ll (1976).
48. See State Legislative Responses, supra note 1, at 1448.
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seems worth what might be gained by doing so. As discussed above,
the reduction of deterrence will be negligible even if physicians benefit
from the reduction in damages paid. Further, the ultimate beneficiaries
are broad classes - in one case all patients, in the other, all those
possessing insurance coverage - which are probably composed mainly
of the same persons.4"
There is a final question which has been raised earlier in con-
nection with ceilings on the amount of recovery. Is there a justifica-
tion for confining the modification (in this case elimination of the
collateral source rule) to medical malpractice claims? It has been
noted that elimination of the rule is unlikely to affect the behavior of
physicians because there are other factors (e.g., genuine desire to
provide quality care, fear of adverse publicity, and the possibility of
peer disciplinary action) that would maintain their incentive to act
with care. Similar factors are clearly present in other areas of pro-
fessional liability. It could conceivably be argued that in cases where
these factors are not present, elimination of the rule would reduce deter-
rence of unsafe conduct. Although their absence might have minor
effects, it seems unreasonable to expect any serious loss of deterrence.
There is therefore little justification for confining modifications of the
collateral source rule to medical malpractice cases. Uniform treatment
in all cases is warranted.
3) Periodic Payments
The possibility that a claimant might either die or fully recover
from his injuries shortly after receipt of a large award has prompted
proposals that damage awards be paid periodically instead of in a
lump sum.5" The concept of periodic damage payments for personal
49. No modification of the collateral source rule has shifted the benefit to the
collateral source. Rather, defendant's obligation has in each case been reduced. A
version of the former approach is, however, suggested in Havighurst & Tancredi,
"Medical Adversity Insurance" - A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and
Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 125, 129 (1973), reprinted in
1974 INs. L.J. 69, 72 [hereinafter cited as Havighurst & Tancredi, citations to INs.
L.J.]. Medical Adversity Insurance (MAI) is a no-fault medical accident compensa-
tion system under which large numbers of persons would receive compensation for
their injuries (probably at a reduced rate). MAI is expressly designed to improve
upon the quality assurance aspect of the tort system. Since under MAI the number
of incidents respecting which health care providers would be required to pay com-
pensation would be much larger than at present, the quality incentive that might be
produced by requiring the reimbursement of claimants' collateral sources could be
significantly' greater than those produced by such a requirement within the existing
compensation system.
50. See, e.g., MALPRACTICE IN Focus, supra note 7, at 27; American Medical
Association, "Discussion Draft" - Testimony for Remedial Legislation 16 (1975);
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injuries is not new.5 1 Two approaches may be taken. First, upon
entry of a judgment, the defendant might be ordered to purchase an
annuity or to deposit sufficient funds in trust to pay plaintiff his esti-
mated annual damages during each year of his life expectancy.5 A
second method of providing periodic payment would be to provide for
periodic adjustable payments dependent upon plaintiff's current
damages.
Neither method of periodic payment is likely to reduce overall
costs. The annuity method of periodic payment would reduce costs only
if jury decisions concerning damages have been generally inaccurate
in one or more respects. The annuity approach would of course
eliminate windfalls to the heirs of plaintiffs who die prior to the life
expectancy upon which the jury has based its award, but it would
also require payments to plaintiffs who outlive their life expectancies.
These parties would receive larger awards than are paid to them under
the "lump sum" award system. If juries, on the whole, have been
overestimating plaintiffs' life expectancies this annuity method might
result in costs savings. If, on the other hand, such estimates have been
randomly inaccurate, the method should result in no savings. An-
other jury miscalculation that might be remedied by this approach
is the estimation of plaintiffs' investment abilities. To the extent
that juries inflate awards to ensure that the proper sum will be avail-
able despite plaintiffs' poor investment of the award, the use of an
annuity for payment might produce net savings.
There are several additional reasons why the second approach,
the payment of periodic but adjustable damages, might result in cost
savings, but that approach also entails greater danger of increasing
overall costs. First, if overestimation of life expectancies and under-
estimation of plaintiffs' investment capacities have been occurring,
savings might accrue in the same manner as under the annuity ap-
proach. In addition, in the event that the inflation during plaintiff's
Maryland Hospital Association, Inc., Malpractice Insurance Position Paper 8 (Sept.
1975) ; Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of the State of Maryland, Statement to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Study Committee of Maryland 4 (1975) [all the above
are on file with the Maryland Law Review].
51. Periodic payment is one of the basic elements of most workmen's compensa-
tion systems. See 1 A. LARSEN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.60
(1972); 8 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1790 (3d ed. 1951).
52. A variation might involve the periodic payment of only special damages, such
as medical expenses and lost wages, with general damages being paid "up front." See,
e.g., Ala. H.B. 300 § 13 (1975), reproduced in State Legislative Responses, supra
note 1, at 1454 n.184. That Alabama bill as finally passed provided for periodic pay-
ment of all damages (less out-of-pocket expenses and attorney's fees). See No. 513,
§ 10, 1975 Ala. Acts 1159.
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lifetime is lower than was predicted at trial, periodic adjustment of
the award may be less expensive than payment of a lump sum. The
opposite, of course, is just as likely to occur. Finally, the periodic
adjustment approach may be less expensive if juries have generally
overestimated the permanence or severity of plaintiffs' injuries.
The factor that must be considered in weighing the advantages
of periodic adjustment of awards is the inevitable administrative and
legal costs. Even if savings might be captured by sharpening the
damage estimation process through periodic rehearings, these savings
could be easily depleted by the costs of counsel and experts at the
additional proceedings. Any benefits accruing from periodic payment
would lie instead in the system's increased capacity to make finely-
tuned damage awards. Some defendants would pay more, some less;
some claimants, in the long run, would receive more, and some would
receive less than they would under the current system, but it is diffi-
cult to conclude that changes in the method of payment could produce
overall savings.
C. Adjustment of the Roles of Judge and Jury
Modern tort law often delegates broad authority to juries." This
delegation occurs in both formal and informal ways. First, Holmes
was probably too optimistic in his prediction that a fund of experience
with similar cases would increasingly enable trial judges to establish
required standards of care without jury assistance.54 Tort law con-
tinues to rely upon juries for judgments concerning the reasonableness
of defendants' conduct. Further, courts are generally reluctant to pro-
vide juries with written statements of the rules of law that they are
charged with applying. Inevitably, the jury's decision reflects common
sense, conscience, or prejudice.
That there is wisdom in allowing the trier of fact some latitude
is indisputable. Juries should have freedom to counterbalance the
rigidities of legal doctrine with their own notions of fairness. The
wisdom of this notion in general, however, does not mean that judges
should abdicate their responsibility to impose the obligations of the
53. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 883-95 (1956) ; Nixon,
Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 476, 479 (1936).
54. See 0. HOLMES, THE CoivrmoN LAW 98-103 (M. Howe ed. 1963). See also
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1942): "Modern
courts are curiously prone to dodge the responsibility of deciding the negligence issue -
it sometimes goes to the jury even when the defendant's conduct is not in dispute,
and even though a verdict of negligence would be outrageous."
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law on juries as best they can. To refrain from doing so would be to
discard the desirable tension between legal formality and community
conscience in favor of unregulated jury discretion.
Increased assertion of decision-making authority by trial judges
might provide a more equitable and precise means of redressing im-
proper imbalances between plaintiffs and defendants in medical mal-
practice cases than would the substantial reformulations of the legal
doctrines discussed earlier. For example, the exercise of judicial
authority to exclude the testimony of those who do not qualify as
experts in the specialty of the defendant, to direct a verdict for de-
fendants in situations where plaintiffs' reliance on res ipsa loquitur
is misplaced, and to reduce excessive verdicts might remedy inequities
without resort to harsh solutions that will unfairly hamper meritorious
claims.
Application of the law regarding the standard of care is another
area in which increased assertion of judicial authority might achieve
justice in particular cases more effectively than wholesale substantive
law reform. A physician is obliged to exercise that degree of skill and
care possessed by other members of his profession or specialty. This
is a standard based on custom, but not all physicians would choose the
same form of treatment or provide it in the same manner - differing
schools of thought exist with respect to the treatment of many con-
ditions. Thus a rule has developed that if the physician follows a
standard that is acceptable to a "respectable minority" of the profession,
then "he is within the bounds of permissible conduct."55 Yet allowing
juries relatively unguided discretion to make the required findings
of fact and to apply the standard of care to those facts may inadvertently
encourage a shift away from this "respectable minority" rule.5"
Consider the following trial situation. Plaintiff's case consists
in part of expert testimony concerning the standard of care that defend-
ant should have met and his failure -to conform to it. Defendant's case
also consists in part of expert testimony, but defendant's expert testifies
that he (and a respectable minority of others) would choose a different
course of treatment than plaintiff's expert. Defendant's expert con-
cludes that defendant conformed to the standard of the minority view.
55. See D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
§ 8.04 (1973) ; W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 16, at 163.
56. I am indebted to Professors Oscar S. Gray and Jon T. Hirschoff for having
suggested that an "under the table" shift away from this standard may be occurring
at the trial level. The American Bar Association Commission on Medical Professional
Liability is currently analyzing a sample of case records in order to determine, among
other things, if this is the case. See American Bar Association Commission on Medical
Professional Liability, Information Report 7 (Jan. 5, 1976).
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If this expert's testimony is accurate, then the defendant should pre-
vail. The jury's function in such a situation should be quite limited: to
assess the credibility of defendant's expert. Unless plaintiff has intro-
duced evidence tending to prove that the standard of conduct to which
the defendant conformed is not acceptable to a "respectable minority"
of physicians, the jury should be directed to find for the defendant.
Admittedly, although such cases are perhaps common, the evidence
in a typical case is probably more complicated. First, the circumstances
that existed at the time of the alleged malpractice may be in dispute.
Second, features of the defendant's conduct - what action he took and
when he took it, for example - may be the subject of disagreement.
Finally, the proper standard of care and its application to the facts,
whatever they are, will also be at issue. In this more complex setting
a simple charge to the jury based on the credibility of defendant's
expert normally will not suffice. If, however, defendant's expert has
testified that the defendant followed a standard accepted by a respecta-
ble minority, even accepting the plaintiff's factual contentions, then the
issue for the jury should be that expert's credibility. Even in cases in
which there is no such testimony, the trial judge may use his charge
to guide the jury by asking it first to determine what conditions existed
at the time of the incident, next to determine what actions the defendant
took and when he took them, and only then to apply the proper standard
of care. A special verdict procedure in which the jury is required to
make these individual findings might be useful under such circumstances.
Undoubtedly a jury determined to find for one party might do so despite
its belief in the truth of his adversary's factual contentions. Never-
theless there are surely fewer jurors who would do this than those who
at present, out of frustration or confusion in sorting out the legal and
factual issues in the case, find for the party with whom they sympathize.
The ability of the jury to ignore the court's charge and the
difficulty which even sincere jurors may experience in attempting to
faithfully execute that charge are phenomena that are characteristic
not only of medical malpractice claims, but of many other personal
injury cases as well. Yet the justification for allowing these phenomena
to operate is less compelling in malpractice cases than in most others.
Counterbalancing the rigidity of the law by introducing the conscience
of jurors familiar with the behavior of ordinary people may be proper
in the standard negligence case because the ultimate issue in such
cases is in fact the kind of behavior required of the ordinary person.
The standards of behavior required of defendants in medical mal-
practice cases, however, are not set by the community-at-large. Juries
in most cases are totally unfamiliar with and unable to evaluate the
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professional quality of the defendant except by reference to the testi-
mony of experts. Therefore, juries in medical malpractice and other
professional liability cases should be allowed considerably less latitude
in applying the standard of care than in other negligence cases.
The relationship between damages and causation is a final area
in which increased assertion of judicial authority may be desirable.
Medical malpractice claims present a practical problem that rarely
arises in other tort cases. In the typical tort claim there is relatively
little difficulty in proving that the defendant's act was the cause-in-fact
of plaintiff's injuries. The physical condition of the plaintiff at the
time of the accident is usually easily demonstrable. Unless the plaintiff
had already been injured or diseased, he probably would have re-
mained in healthy condition but for the defendant's act. The matter
of causation is seldom so simple in medical malpractice claims. People
who enter physicians' offices and hospitals are injured or diseased.
Even if the defendant has committed an act constituting malpractice,
there will not always be a demonstrable connection between this act and
the plaintiff's subsequent injuries. There are two other possible explana-
tions. First, these injuries may be the result of the plaintiff's underlying
condition - a natural progression of the injury or disease for which
he sought treatment from the defendant. Second, these injuries may
be the result of some feature of the medical intervention undertaken
by the defendant, but not the result of that feature which the plaintiff
has characterized as malpractice. Unless the jury is convinced that
the defendant's malpractice, rather than the plaintiff's underlying
condition or some legally neutral medical intervention, is the cause
of the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant should prevail. This is merely
an application of the rule that the plaintiff has the burden of proving
each element of his cause of action.
The plaintiff's problem is that much of the operation of the human
body remains a medical mystery. Moreover, much of what has been
learned about the body is not a matter of common knowledge. Expert
testimony is therefore often required not only concerning the standard
of care, but concerning the causal relationship between defendant's
alleged failure to conform to that standard and plaintiff's injuries.
Often this testimony must be based on a reconstruction of the plain-
tiff's probable condition at various points during treatment. The
primary responsibility for contesting the factual basis of such a recon-
struction and of the expert's opinion concerning the causal relation-
ship between the treatment and the subsequent disability must of
course rest on defense counsel. But when the state of medical knowl-
edge does not support an informed conclusion concerning the condi-
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tion of the patient at critical points or concerning the causal connection
between the alleged act of malpractice and the plaintiff's injuries,
trial judges should exercise their authority to keep cases from the
jury by granting directed verdicts. It is impossible to determine
how many cases are sent to the jury with inadequately formulated or
misunderstood guidelines: a detailed study of the evidence and jury
charges in many cases would be necessary before even an educated guess
could be hazarded. Moreover, it cannot be demonstrated objectively
that criticisms, which on the surface appear to be directed at particular
doctrines, are really indicative of less focused dissatisfaction with the
entire system. But the suspicion is strong that the same level of
concern would reverberate even in a jurisdiction that has enacted the
entire catalogue of tort law reforms canvassed here. Those concerns
would continue not merely out of a desire to further reduce insurance
premiums (assuming the reforms could have any serious effect on
these), but because there would still persist a sense that there had
been a weakening of the control necessary to ensure that the law on
the books and the law in action largely coincide. This is a much more
difficult problem to deal with than evaluation of legal doctrines, but
this relationship between the theory of the system and its operation
may well be at the heart of the current controversy.
IV. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF CLAIM RESOLUTION
A. The Medical Review Board
Another method of managing the cost of medical malpractice is
to encourage resolution of claims before non-judicial forums. Nor-
mally, parties in litigation do not obtain a definitive determination of
the strength of their respective cases until a final decision is delivered.
One way to encourage the settlement of claims is to provide one or
both the parties with such a determination, albeit nonbinding, at an
earlier stage in the dispute.57
This concept was first applied in the "medical review board" -
a body of physicians convened to hear the facts of a claim in informal
fashion and to render a decision as to the possible commission of
malpractice by the defendant."8 In some instances this nonstatutory
57. See Documentary Supplement, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alter-
native Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 695, 709-10
(1972) ; State Legislative Responses, supra note 1, at 1456. See generally Baird,
Munsterman & Stevens, Alternatives to Litigation, I: Technical Analysis, SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION REPORT (Appendix), supra note 4, at 214.
58. See Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, Alternatives to Litigation, I: Technical
Analysis, SECRETARY'S CoMMISSION REPORT (Appendix), supra note 4, at 224-25.
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review is available only to physicians; the board's decision is in essence
"advice" to the physician about whether to settle or to litigate the
dispute. Other boards, however, also allow claimants to make a
presentation. If the physician's insurance policy grants him the right
to decide whether to settle a case, the review procedure provides a
method for avoiding the investment of resources in defense litigation
doomed to failure. An impartial recommendation by a physician's
colleagues that the case be settled may encourage a settlement in those
instances in which a stubborn defendant would otherwise refuse to
accept the advice of his insurer or where the insurer's estimate of the
chances of a successful defense of the claim is too optimistic.
The success of any nonbinding review procedure in encouraging
settlement of claims depends at least in part upon its capacity to pre-
dict what will occur at trial. When review procedures accurately re-
flect the nature of trial presentation, the parties must afford great
weight to the recommendation of the board because its prediction is
likely to be accurate. If only physicians sit on the board, if the plaintiff
does not present his side of the case, or if damages are not in issue,
it is less likely that the board's recommendations will be followed than
if the procedure provides a more reliable and complete picture of the
strength of the parties' positions. The medical review board provides
an incomplete picture.
B. The Screening Panel
Legislative action in at least nineteen states59 over the last two
years has created screening panels, a procedure designed to achieve the
objectives of the medical review board in more effective fashion. The
59. See ch. 1, 1976 Ariz. Leg. Serv. No. 1, at 15-18 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 12-567); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2602 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.133
(Supp. 1976-1977); ch. 278, 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws 953; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§
58.2-.10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976-1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9 (Burns Supp.
1976) ; ch. 249, 1976, Kans. Sess. Laws 970; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West
Supp. 1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A01 ta 2A09 (Cum. Supp. 1976) ;
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (Supp. 1975); Leg. Bill 434, §§ 40-47, 1976 Neb.
Laws 151; NEv. REv. STAT. § 41A.020 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-33-14 to 24
(Supp. 1976); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1975); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.301-606 (Supp.
1976-1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3401 to 21 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-911
to 22 (Supp. 1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.02-21 (1976). Joint Medical-Legal
Screening Panels had been in existence in parts of Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Idaho,
Maine, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin for some
years even without statutory authorization. See Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, Alterna-
tives To Litigation, I: Technical Analysis, SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT (Ap-
pendix), supra note 4, at 228.
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screening panel is intended to encourage early settlement of meritorious
claims and voluntary dismissal of nonmeritorious claims. By "screen-
ing out" some claims that would otherwise proceed to trial, the cost
of litigating those claims is avoided. Although the use of screening
panels varies somewhat from state to state, a general pattern is
emerging.
1) Composition of the panel. In contrast to the medical review
board, the screening panel is not composed solely of physicians. Typi-
cally, an attorney, a physician, and a layperson serve. The presence of
an attorney on the panel means that the law of professional liability can
be more accurately applied. The physician provides technical expertise,
and the layperson serves as the panel's conscience - more or less the
jury "representative." The decision of a mixed panel is more likely to
be accepted by plaintiffs because its credibility for him is greater than
that of a medical board.
2) Scope of Authority. Submission of claims to the panel is
generally mandatory, 60 but the panel's decision is not binding because
the right to a jury trial de novo (though termed an "appeal" in some
statutes) is preserved. Some states have given the panel authority to
make a decision as to liability only ;"1 in others, decisional authority ex-
tends also to damages.12 There is a major weakness in screening panel
designs of the former type. If the panel's decision covers liability only,
then damages, a major feature of the case, is left undecided. Because
the parties will not have a complete picture of the strength of this aspect
of their cases, fewer claims will be screened out. On the other hand,
the unique capabilities of the panel - those that might be said to
justify creating the procedure itself - lie in the combined expertise of
the physician and attorney on the question of liability. Whether the
panel will have abilities superior to those of the typical jury in the
area of damages is doubtful. Authority to make findings regarding
damages may nevertheless be necessary to the successful functioning of
60. But see VA. CODE ANN. § 8-912 (Supp. 1976).
61. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(G) (West Supp. 1976); NEV.
STAT. ANN. § 41A.060 (1975) (board to render a decision whether there is a "rea-
sonable probability that the acts complained of constitute professional negligence").
62. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34.2605 (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 58.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976-1977) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.508(9) (Supp.
1976-1977). In some states the finding does not include a specific sum. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.133(8) (Supp. 1976-1977) (after a finding of liability, the panel
may, upon agreement of the parties, make a recommendation as to the "reasonable
range of damages") ; IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-7(d) (Burns Supp. 1976 (panel
to find the "extent and duration of disability" and "any permanent impairment and the
percentage of the impairment").
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the procedure. A comparison of the claim settlement experience in states
with these different procedures should eventually provide guidance.
3) Effect and Reviewability of Decision. In some states the decision
of the panel has no effect in a subsequent trial de novo. 63 In others,
the decision of the panel is admissible in evidence.64 In most instances
the scope of the judicial review to which these decisions may be sub-
jected prior to their admission in evidence is unclear. In the absence
of an express statutory provision, 5 the panel decision should not be
admissible upon proof that there was a material failure of the panel to
perform its statutory duties. The most important of these statutory
duties, either express or implied, is to apply existing law. 6 Neverthe-
less, counsel may encounter difficulty in proving error, because most
statutes do not require the panel to render an opinion detailing the
legal bases of its decision. The absence of explanatory opinions may
allow panels broad discretion to determine questions of liability and
damages without reference to the rules of law governing these matters.
There is no reason to believe that the various panels would exercise
this power to ignore the law in similar fashion. Some might enlarge
the scope of liability, while others might narrow it. Since the panel's
decision is likely to be a strong influence on a jury in any later trial,
decisions concerning admissibility should be made with a view toward
encouraging responsible application of the law and a semblance of uni-
formity in future panel determinations. Whenever the basis of the panel's
decision can be ascertained and does not conform to existing law (or
when it is clearly arbitrary), the decision should be excluded from
evidence. Otherwise, the use of screening panels may produce a random
enlargement or contraction of the right to recover in medical malpractice
cases.
0 7
63. There is no reference to admissibility, for example, in the Nevada statute.
See note 59 supra. The Arkansas statute states expressly that the panel's findings
may not be used in other proceedings. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2609 (Supp. 1975).
64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.134(2) (Supp. 1976-1977) ; IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(I) (Supp.
1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-2A06(d) (Supp. 1976); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40 § 1301.510 (Supp. 1976-1977) (finding regarding liability is admissible,
finding regarding damages is not) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 23.3409 (Supp. 1975).
65. Ohio is one of the few states that does make comparatively express provision
for review. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(c) (Page Supp. 1975).
66. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-33-20 (Supp. 1976) (providing that the
panel "shall decide . . . (1) whether there is substantial evidence that the acts com-
plained of occurred and that they constitute malpractice").




4) Prehearing and Hearing Procedure. In most states, parties
before a screening panel are allowed prehearing discovery rights par-
alleling those provided litigants prior to a trial.68 Evidence considered
at the hearing may consist entirely of written submissions69 or may
include both written submissions and oral testimony.70 The hearings
are usually informal and do not involve strict adherence to the rules
of evidence. 71 This flexible structure permits the panel's decision to be
informed yet avoids the equivalent of a full-scale trial - the expensive
procedure that screening panel legislation seeks to avoid. There is a
real possibility, however, that the added costs of screening panels will
exceed the savings from their use. First, extra costs will be incurred
in every case that is not settled after a panel hearing, because another
layer of procedure will have been added. Second, extensive discovery,
preparation, and participation by counsel in a hearing will occur even
in those cases that are settled after a hearing. This is especially true
in jurisdictions where the decisions of the panel are admissible at trial.
The counsels' preparation for their presentations to the panel will be
extensive because the panel's decision may be very influential evidence
before a jury. Moreover, some of these cases might have been settled
prior to trial under the current system, perhaps without as much invest-
ment in their resolution. Finally, the availability of the informal and
initially less expensive screening panel procedure may encourage the
filing of claims that would not otherwise be made, thus adding to the
total cost of resolving claims.
One way to limit costs is to curtail both discovery and the length
of the hearing before the panel. None of the existing schemes limit
either the amount of time or the number of witnesses the parties may
call. Admitting a panel's decision into evidence when prehearing dis-
covery and the hearing itself have been severely limited may be unfair,
68. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.133(5) (Supp. 1976-1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, § 58.6(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976-1977) ; IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-4 (Bums
Supp. 1976) (such discovery as the panel allows); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.47(D)
(Supp. 1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-2A05(b) (Supp. 1976); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.07 (Page 1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.508(3) (Supp.
1976-1977) (the panel itself may take depositions). In states in which a civil action
is first filed and then referred to the panel, litigants probably have the right to dis-
covery pursuant to existing rules of civil procedure. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
231, § 60B (Supp. 1975).
69. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-4 (Burns Supp. 1976); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 1299.47(D) (Supp. 1976).
70. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.133(6) (Supp. 1976-1977); ILL STAT. ANN.
ch. 110, § 58.6(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976-1977).




however, because the panel may not have had sufficient facts before it
to reach a proper decision. The choice, then, is between a comparatively
complete and costly procedure which possesses the deterrent of admis-
sibility, and a streamlined, less expensive procedure, which will prob-
ably screen out fewer cases because its panel decision will be inadmis-
sible. A compromise approach, in which the panel's decision remains
admissible might be fashioned. A permanent hearing administrator
might limit discovery on an ad hoc basis, and the panel itself might
"encourage" the parties to be brief during the hearing. No state has
adopted this compromise approach; experience in the next few years
may reveal whether it will be necessary.
C. Binding Arbitration
The most important difference between binding arbitration and
screening panels is that a trial de novo is not available after binding arbi-
tration, because the decision of an arbitration board is final. Although
binding arbitration may be either compulsory or voluntary, no state
has mandated arbitration of medical malpractice claims. Several states,
however, have enacted legislation expressly authorizing or regulating
voluntary binding arbitration of such cases. 72  In addition, many
states have enacted versions of the Uniform Arbitration Act,73 pursuant
to which voluntary binding arbitration of medical malpractice claims be-
comes valid.74 In avoiding a trial in a court of law, arbitration may re-
duce the costs of adjudication by resolving disputes in a less formal
setting and before persons who are more familiar with the complexities
of medical treatment and the law than a jury. Some proponents also
claim that arbitration will stabilize the amounts awarded by removing
the emotionalism that characterizes jury trials.75
72. See No. 513, § 8, 1975 Ala. Acts 1158; CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1295 (West
Supp. 1976); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4230-36 (West 1975); MicH. CoMP. LAws
ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065 (Supp. 1976-1977) (certain health care providers required to
offer patients the arbitration option) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01, 2711.21-24
(Page Supp. 1975) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25A to 25B, 58-41-58 (Supp.
1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 7001-08 (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-922
(Supp. 1976).
73. See D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 937-38 (1973).
74. For a comprehensive analysis of the applicability of arbitration law in each
state to medical malpractice disputes, see Wadlington, Alternatives to Litigation, IV:
The Law of Arbitration In The U.S., SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT (Appendix),
supra note 4, at 346.
75. See Bergen, Arbitration of Medical Liability, 211 J.A.M.A. 175, 176 (1970);




Voluntary binding arbitration must overcome several substantial
problems in order to succeed. First, arbitrators may compromise more
claims than juries. The result of such a tendency would be a higher per-
centage of decisions for claimants, albeit with lower average awards.7"
In addition, since the presentation of a case to a board of arbitration
may prove simpler and less technical than presentation in a trial by
jury, the filing of claims that are currently foreclosed because of their
low potential recovery may be encouraged. The only serious statistical
study of arbitration currently available does not provide definitive con-
clusions regarding these questions."" Of course, the absence of major
cost savings from voluntary binding arbitration of medical malpractice
claims will not necessarily undermine the approach if the parties to
arbitration are generally more satisfied with the results than parties
to adjudication. For the physician, arbitration allows his conduct to
be evaluated both without adverse publicity and by a board which often
includes his peers; for the claimant, the informality of arbitration may
be more agreeable than a formal jury trial which follows strict rules of
evidence.
Two purely legal problems will have to be resolved as the incidence
of voluntary binding arbitration increases. The first involves the
validity of agreements to arbitrate. When the agreement is made at
the time the patient needs treatment (and therefore prior to the ex-
istence of a claim), the patient's physical condition as well as his de-
pendence on the health care provider for necessary medical care may
affect his ability to understand and evaluate the wisdom of entering
into the agreement. Therefore, if the health care provider were to
seek a court order to compel compliance with the agreement to arbitrate.
the patient might raise defenses of incompetency or unconscionability.78
Several statutes address this problem by granting the patient a right
to rescind the agreement within a specified period after execution or
termination of treatment.79 In other states the courts will inevitably be
forced to make case-by-case determinations of the validity of arbitration
agreements executed in varying circumstances. Until general rules are
76. For example, four out of five medical malpractice cases actually tried to a
verdict in 1970 resulted in a finding in favor of the defendant. See SECRETARY'S COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
77. See Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Is It Cost Effective?,
36 MD. L. REv. 533 (1977).
78. See generally Henderson, Alternatives to Litigation, III: Contractual Prob-
lems In the Enforcement of Agreements To Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, SECRE-
TARY'S COMMISSION REPORT (Appendix), supra note 4, at 321.
79. See, e.g,, CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1295(c) (West Supp. 1976); MIcH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.5041(3) (Supp. 1976-1977); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-922 (Supp. 1976).
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established, the overall cost of arbitration will be unnaturally inflated
because of the cost of testing the validity of agreements executed under
these varying conditions.8"
A second problem involves the availability of judicial review of
the arbitration decision. The more systematic statutes prescribe, either
expressly or by reference to other standards, the standard of care to
be applied by the arbitrators.8' Failure of the arbitrators to follow
this prescription should be grounds for setting aside the decision. In
jurisdictions where the applicable statute does not prescribe a standard
of care to be applied by the arbitrators but merely authorizes the sub-
mission of a "dispute" or "controversy" to arbitration, the availability
of judicial review is less clear.82 For example, the grounds for review
of arbitration decisions in the typical general arbitration statute do not
include the commission of legal error by the arbitrators.8 Thus, unless
the arbitration agreement itself prescribes the standard of care to be
applied by the arbitrators, 4 they may have the discretion to make an
independent determination of the appropriate standard by which to
evaluate the defendant's conduct.
It is too early to discern the effect of this apparent discretion,
although there are a number of possibilities. First, despite the absence
of express obligation, arbitrators may feel inclined or obliged to follow
existing law, at least as a general guideline in making decisions. Second,
the combination of individual arbitration decisions could result in a
subtle change toward strict liability of the health care provider, per-
haps for less than "full" damages. Third, a change in the opposite
direction might occur whereby health care providers would be liable
only for actions taken in bad faith or in reckless disregard of the
appropriate course of conduct. Finally, each of the above effects might
80. For a discussion of the effect of this cost on the Southern California Arbi-
tration Project, see Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Is It Cost
Effective?, 36 MD. L. REV. 533 (1977).
81. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1295(a) (West Supp. 1976) (test is whether
treatment was "negligently" provided) ; MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5043(b)
(Supp. 1976-1977) (test is the standard of care prevailing in civil cases).
82. See, e.g., No. 513, § 8, 1975 Ala. Acts 1158 (medical malpractice claim arbi-
tration) ; Mo. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1974) (general arbitra-
tion statute).
83. For a survey of the grounds for modifying and vacating arbitration awards
in each jurisdiction, see Wadlington, Alternatives to Litigation, IV: The Law of
Arbitration in the U.S., SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT (Appendix), supra note 4,
at 346.
84. Since some statutes provide that the award may be vacated if the arbitrators
have "exceeded their powers," refusal to apply the standard prescribed by the arbi-
tration agreement is probably sufficient ground. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE
ANN. § 3-224(b) (3) (1974).
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occur at different times, depending on the nature of the dispute and the
composition of the arbitration panels. As the scope of this discretion
becomes recognized, arbitration could be easily transformed into the
battle of emotions and contrast of personalities that some currently
attribute to trials by jury. The predictability and stability that might
be achieved through a system of arbitration may turn out, then, to be
illusory goals.
V. NEW COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
A. Channelling
One of the many reasons that the increases in medical malpractice
claim frequency and severity have been perceived as a "crisis" is that a
relatively small group of private parties, practicing physicians, have
suffered the immediate effects of that increase. Although physicians
may eventually pass on the costs of increased liability insurance pre-
miums to patients, physicians initially pay this cost. Some of the ad-
verse effects of this phenomenon could be avoided if liability were
shifted to a group of individuals or institutions who could serve as a
conduit for assessing the cost of insurance more easily. There are a
number of ways in which this shift could be accomplished. First, phy-
sicians could be completely relieved of liability for malpractice. Patients
might then purchase their own insurance against the commission of
medical malpractice by a treating physician. This insurance might even
be purchased in the same way an airline passenger purchases flight
insurance. The cost of insuring against medical malpractice would
thus be spread immediately to a much larger group of persons - all
patients, as opposed to all physicians. Another method would likewise
relieve physicians of medical malpractice liability but simultaneously
would require employers to insure their employees against the com-
mission of malpractice. Finally, compensation could be provided by
government and financed through broad-based taxation. The main
weakness of each of these approaches is that the elimination of phy-
sician liability also eradicates the incentive toward care and safety pro-
duced by the threat of liability.5
An alternative that might avoid this dimunition in deterrence of
unsafe behavior is to "channel" liability through hospitals.8" Although
85. For a detailed theoretical analysis of the relationship between the various
goals of accident law, see G. C~ALARsrS, THE CosTs OF AccmENTS (1970).
86. The two leading proposals for this form of channelling are contained in
VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 79-93 and Steves, A Proposal to Improve the Cost
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the number of hospitals is smaller than the number of physicians, the
ability of hospitals to spread the cost of insuring against liability to a
large number of persons could ameliorate the financial burdens of
channelling liability through physicians. The system might be struc-
tured along the following lines. Physicians would be relieved of lia-
bility for any act of malpractice occurring within a hospital. Since
approximately seventy-five percent of all malpractice actions concern
treatment provided within hospitals, 7 this immunity should quickly
reduce physicians' premiums for out-of-hospital treatment liability in-
surance. Concurrently, each hospital would become liable for all acts
of malpractice occurring within its walls, regardless of whether they
are caused by the acts, of the hospital's employees. The cost of addi-
tional insurance that each hospital would have to procure would be
passed on to patients in the form of increased charges. Premiums would
be based in part on each hospital's claims experience so there would be
an incentive to reduce the incidence of claims by monitoring or audit-
ing treatment provided within the hospital.
Although channelling liability through hospitals would increase
their incentive to reduce the incidence of malpractice occurring within
their walls, the physicians relieved of liability would thereafter have
less financial incentive to avoid malpractice. Thus, this form of chan-
nelling might result in increased malpractice. Enabling legislation
might mitigate this effect in several ways. Hospitals might be given
more authority to control or supervise the practices of physicians
granted the privilege of providing treatment to admitted patients. Such
legislation might also impose on physicians an obligation to indemnify
the hospital for a portion of its liability resulting from their negligent
treatment. For example, physicians might be liable to hospitals for
fifty percent of the first $5,000 (or any other sum, up to a maximum
per year) paid on any claim. Such an approach would retain a measure
of financial incentive for physicians to exercise care in treatment. Even
without such legislation, similar relationships might be produced
through the bargaining of physicians and hospitals after the inception
of channelling.
Although the channelling proposal is intriguing, it is nevertheless
doubtful that the prevailing public mood would support the abolition
of direct physician liability for the consequences of their malpractice.
to Benefit Relationships in the Medical Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975
DuKE L.J. 1305.
87. Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims Files
Closed in 1970, SEcRETARY'S CoMmiSS ON REPoRT (Appendix), supra note 4, at 10;
I.S.O. SuRvEy, supra note 23, at 33.
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Until more effective control and review of physician behavior is de-
veloped,88 channelling is likely to remain on the sidelines of reform.
B. No-Fault Compensation
No-fault compensation is the most fundamental of the reforms
surveyed in this essay. Not only would this reform alter the system of
insuring against medical liability and the method by which compensa-
tion for injury is paid, but it would also effectively revise the legal
standard of care required of physicians. Not surprisingly, proposals
for instituting no-fault systems raise fascinating but troublesome
questions.
The proponents of no-fault systems (notably Professors Clark
Havighurst"9 and Jeffrey O'Connell ° ) have fashioned their recom-
mendations in response to defects in the existing liability/compensation
system: it is extraordinarily expensive to administer; its effectiveness
in deterring substandard conduct is doubtful; the incidence of claims
is haphazard; and physicians are subjected to stigma for marginal
errors and forced to undergo prolonged review of the treatment in-
volving these debatable errors.
The alternative advocated seeks to avoid these defects through an
abolition of tort liability and the substitution of a no-fault compensation
system. Within the sphere of the system's operation, the existence of
fault by medical personnel would be irrelevant to a patient's right to
compensation. Instead, health care providers would procure insurance
covering their patients in the event of certain injuries, regardless of
whether they are caused by malpractice. Any patient suffering a covered
injury - a "compensable event" - would be compensated. Ideally, such
a system would reduce the expense of compensating the patient because:
the high cost of determining whether malpractice has occurred would
88. For a discussion of Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs),
the most prominant device for such control and review, see Ball, PSRO: An Alterna-
tive to the Medical Malpractice System as a Quality Assurance Mechanism, 36 MD.
L. REv. 566 (1977).
89. See Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance" - Has Its Time Come?,
1975 DuKE L.J. 1233 [hereinafter cited as Havighurst]; Havighurst & Tancredi, supra
note 49.
90. See J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975); O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract for
Doctors, Manufacturers, Retailers and Others, 1975 INS. L.J. 531; O'Connell, Elective
No-Fault Liability by Contract - With or Without An Enabling Statute, 1975 U.
ILL. L.F. 59; O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective
No-Fault For Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv. 501 (1976); O'Connell,
Contracting for No-Fault Liability Insurance Covering Doctors and Hospital, 36
MD. L. REv. 533 (1977).
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be eliminated; systematic feedback concerning the incidence of com-
pensable events coupled with the financial incentive to avoid them
would promote safety; and the stigma of a malpractice claim would be
replaced by the neutral fact that a patient had submitted a claim for
compensation. Nevertheless, a no-fault system would have to over-
come a raft of theoretical and practical difficulties before it could be
instituted.
1) Defining the Compensable Event. The occurrence of an injury
caused by the malpractice of a health care provider currently affords
the patient a right to compensation. With this fault standard eliminated,
compensation criteria must focus solely on the patient and his injury.
In other fields where either no-fault or strict liability have been insti-
tuted, the task of devising criteria that can identify compensable injuries
has been relatively simpleY1 Injuries "arising out of maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle" are easy to isolate: if a person enters an
automobile healthy and leaves it injured, he has probably suffered an
injury satisfying the above criterion. The same is true for the injuries
"arising out of and in the course of employment" for which workmen's
compensation is paid." But many if not most people who enter hospitals
and physicians' offices have diseases or injuries. Consequently, many
may still be suffering from diseases or injuries after treatment. If
compensation is to be paid only for injuries caused by medical treat-
ment rather than for the disabilities for which treatment was sought,
a method of separating the two must be created, and that method must
be one that does not require costly and time-consuming litigation. 4
Compensable events could be defined in two ways. First, follow-
ing the general principles of workmen's compensation and no-fault
automobile plans, compensation might be paid to any patient suffering
an "injury arising out of or caused by medical treatment." 95 This
general definition approach has several weaknesses. First, considerable
91. See Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590,
614-15 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]; O'Connell, An Alternative To Aban-
doning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault For Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L.
REv. 501, 520-21 (1976). But see Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case For Con-
tract, 1976 AM. BAR FOUN. REs. J. 87, 143-44.
92. NATIONAL CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM MOTOR
VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT, § 2 (Approved Draft, Nov. 1, 1972).
93. See 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 6.00 (1972).
94. See O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract For Doctors, Manufacturers,
Retailers and Others, 1975 INs. L.J. 531, 533.
95. This approach is adopted by the proposed "Kennedy-Inouye" Bill. See S.
215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1711 (a) (1975) (under which compensation would be
payable "for loss from any injury suffered as a result of health care services").
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disagreement can be expected concerning the cause of a claimant's
disability in particular cases. Litigation to determine whether the dis-
ability was caused by medical treatment or by the patient's underlying
medical condition will be necessary. The expense of resolving this
causation issue will increase the cost of operating the system. 6 Second,
the general definition cited above would compensate all treatment-
related injury. If a limitation on the range of compensable injuries is
desired, the definition will have to be qualified by exceptions. Regard-
less of whether these exceptions are phrased generally or are specifi-
cally enumerated, there will be disputes over borderline cases. Some of
these will be litigated, thus adding to the overall costs of compensation.
Finally, the use of a general definition as the touchstone for compensa-
bility will raise what Professor Guido Calabresi has called the "sub-
stitutability" problem.97 Because health care providers' insurance pre-
miums will be based in part on the number of compensable events
occurring, they will have an incentive to try to avoid the occurrence of
these events. In fact, since many more persons would be entitled to
compensation than under the current tort system, the no-fault approach
might produce greater incentives to avoid adverse outcomes of treat-
ment. For the most part, this is a valuable feature of the system, but it
might also encourage the provider to choose a mode of treatment (or
no treatment) that has a lower probability of resulting in a compensable
event than one that is medically preferable. Unless both results are
compensable, there will be undesirable incentives. Creating the neces-
sary catalogue of substitute treatments could prove to be a Herculean
task. Moreover, compensation should in theory also be paid when a
substitute treatment (such as no treatment at all) is followed by a dis-
ability resulting from the claimant's underlying medical condition and
that treatment was not the medically preferable choice. Application of
this criterion is likely to involve problems similar to those of determin-
ing whether a physician has made a negligent choice of treatment9 8
and may also produce the stigma and costs involved in applying that
standard.
A second method of defining compensable events is to list the
injuries for the occurrence of which the patient would be entitled to
compensation. Professor Havighurst has published first drafts of such
lists for three medical specialties as part of his proposal for Medical
96. See Keeton, supra note 91, at 594, 614-15.
97. Remarks made at the Maryland Conference, supra note 6.
98. See Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case For Contract, 1976 AM. BAR
FOUN. REs. J. 87, 145-46.
[VOL. 36
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
Adversity Insurance (MAI)." The advantage of this approach is
that the events that are compensable can be limited until experience in
operating the system is gained. In addition, some of the difficulties
inherent in applying a general definition can be eliminated by careful
construction of the list of compensable events.'10 For example, com-
plicated questions of causation can be circumvented by including only
conditions whose etiology is normally certain. Likewise, the cost of
making close examination of individual conditions in borderline cases of
compensability may be avoided by compensating only for those dis-
abilities that are easy to distinguish from noncompensable disabilities.
Finally, the substitutability problem can be addressed by structuring
the list of compensable events so that whenever the adverse effects of a
preferred mode of treatment are compensable, the undesirable effects of
choosing a substitute treatment are also listed.'
Although enumeration of specific compensable events may mitigate
these causation, borderline and substitutability problems, the concessions
involved in accomplishing these objections should be recognized. A
no-fault system that is limited in scope will have to begin as a partial
substitute for tort liability. While there will be no recovery in tort for
any event compensable on a no-fault basis, "noncompensable" events will
remain subject to tort liability. The relationship between compensability
under a no-fault system and continuing (though partial) tort liability
is therefore crucial. In order to avoid difficult questions of causation,
providing compensation for adverse effects whose etiology is difficult
to trace must be foregone. Similar sacrifices must be made to avoid
incurring the costs of resolving borderline cases: disabilities without
clear characteristics must be uncompensable. Furthermore, to ensure that
99. See Havighurst, supra note 89, at 1256-63; Havighurst & Tancredi, supra
note 49, at 76.
100. See Havighurst, supra note 89, at 1256 n.71:
The list was compiled by reviewing the most common surgical complications
and considering them in light of the following questions:
1. To what extent is the incidence of this complication related to the technical
skill, judgment, or attentiveness of the surgeon?
2. Is this complication a clinically distinct entity? Can its existence be
readily substantiated?
3. How early in the postoperative period is this complication detectable?
4. How costly are the sequelae of this complication?
5. Would an incentive to minimize the occurrence of this complication bias
the choice of treatment in unfortunate ways?
101. This device, of course, leads back into the thicket of attempting to optimize,
rather than minimize, the occurrence of compensable events. See text accompanying
notes 97 & 98 supra. Professor Havighurst makes no claim that MAI will induce
optimal behavior but only that it could introduce "more effective financial incentives."
See Havighurst, supra note 89, at 1249.
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the system does not create perverse treatment incentives, there must be
no compensation for the adverse effects of certain treatments when it is
unfeasible to compensate for the adverse effects of substitute treat-
ments. These sacrifices may also contribute to the perceived unfairness
of the system by providing one group a no-fault remedy while leaving
the other to the tort liability system simply because of a difference in
the types of medical treatment involved. The task that has not yet been
faced is to strike a workable balance between contradictory goals: on
the one hand are the desirability of removing a large portion of claims
from the current compensation system and the need to structure
equitably the system that replaces it; on the other hand is the require-
ment that the range of compensable events be carefully limited in order
to achieve the efficiency that will render the system economically feasible.
2) The Form and Amount of Compensation. The total cost of
instituting a no-fault compensation system is unknown. One reason
for this uncertainty is that there is no consensus as to which events
would be compensable nor as to the level of compensation that would
be paid to patients entitled to receive it. It should be recognized, how-
ever, that a portion of this cost, whatever it is, will represent a re-
categorization of costs previously incurred elsewhere rather than a new
expense. 10 2 For example, a patient who currently suffers a medical
complication not caused by negligence may receive compensation from
several sources. His medical and hospitalization insurance may pay
all or a portion of the additional medical expenses incurred in treating
the complication. Further, if the patient is out of work because of the
complication, disability or unemployment insurance may reimburse him
for lost wages. The cost of purchasing these forms of insurance would
be reduced if no-fault compensation were available for some of these
losses. 0 8 This apparent saving, of course, would reappear immediately
as part of an apparent increase in insurance premiums (in this case no-
fault premiums) paid by health care providers. In short, although the
dollar cost of a no-fault plan may appear high, a portion of this sum
will be costs that have merely been shifted to the no-fault system.
Nevertheless, it is probably a basic political fact that a no-fault
system will not gain acceptance if it requires health care providers to
pay premiums in excess of what they now pay for tort liability insur-
102. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 49, at 89-91.
103. This assumes that the patient would not be entitled to receive compensation
from his collateral insurers if he were entitled to no-fault compensation or that the
collateral insurers would be subrogated to the patient's no-fault rights in the event
that the patient had already been paid by these sources. See Havighurst & Tancredi,
supra note 49, at 89-90.
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ance. The problem, then, is to fashion a system in which the cost of
paying compensation for the events that are covered does not exceed
the cost of the part of the present system that it. supersedes. Since the
occurrence of an injury caused by medical malpractice is not a condition
to receipt of compensation, the number of persons entitled to compensa-
tion will be vastly increased. A reduction in outlays must therefore be
achieved if premiums are to remain at current levels. For the most
part, funds for compensating the "additional" beneficiaries (those whose
injuries have not been caused by malpractice) would have to be pro-
duced by reducing the average amount of compensation paid to any
one of them. The category of compensation that is a prime candidate
for elimination is pain and suffering. 4
Even if pain and suffering damages are not paid and only economic
losses are compensable, it may be difficult to maintain no-fault premiums
at an acceptable level. First, it is unclear whether the reduction in
administrative and legal expenses realized from eliminating disputes
related to the standard of care will offset the cost of resolving the new
issues that may arise. Second, the cost of determining losses on a
patient-to-patient basis is high. This expense could be reduced by
creating schedules of benefits payable for specified compensable events,
but a system that standardizes benefits is susceptible to criticism in
that it treats some victims inequitably by denying them their actual
losses while paying others more than they should receive.'0 5 A more
fundamental problem is that the number of persons who suffer non-
negligently caused treatment-related injuries may be so large that
compensating them even for economic losses alone may be prohibitively
expensive.'00 It is yet to be demonstrated whether the increased in-
centives to avoid adverse outcomes of treatment will produce sufficient
savings (in the form of a decreased incidence of treatment-related in-
juries) to keep the total cost of compensation within practical financial
limitations.
3) Instituting the System. A no-fault system could be created in
a variety of ways, each necessitating a choice among several variables.
104. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 49, at 72; O'Connell, Contracting For
No-Fault Liability Insurance Covering Doctors and Hospitals, 36 MD. L. REv. 533
(1977).
105. See Keeton, supra note 91, at 609-10.
106. Studies of the incidence of treatment-related injuries have discovered that a
surprisingly high percentage of patients suffer such occurrences. See Boyden, Medical
Injuries Described in Hospital Patient Records, SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT
(Appendix), supra note 4, at 41; Pocincki, Dagger & Schwartz, The Incidence of
latrogenic Injuries, SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT (Appendix), supra note 4,




One way is to make participation in the system mandatory for all
patients and health care providers by means of legislation prescribing
both compensable events and award levels. 10 7 The cause of action for
injuries not compensable on a no-fault basis could either be abolished
or preserved. The more extensive the compensable events, the greater
would be the justification for a complete abolition of tort liability,
because patients as a class would receive more in return for the sur-
render of common law rights. 0 8 If the cause of action for malpractice
is preserved, new issues will arise. Some claimants who believe that
they have suffered injuries caused by malpractice will attempt to prove
that their injuries are not compensable on a no-fault basis. Similarly,
the desire of health care providers to avoid malpractice actions might
induce them to disclose borderline events to patients as compensable.
This "defensive disclosure" might confound the system's operation
unless there are strict controls on the manner in which health care
providers disclose to their patients that a compensable event has oc-
curred and sanctions are imposed for false disclosure.'0 9
A no-fault system need not be mandatory. Instead, statutory
authorization for health care providers and patients to contract for the
provision of no-fault insurance could achieve many of the objectives of
107. Although the earliest discussion of MAI seems to contemplate this approach,
the later elaboration entertains the possibility that the system could be elective.
Compare Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 49, at 69-71, with Havighurst, supra
note 89, at 1277-79.
108. The quid pro quo provided patients in return for abolition of the cause of
action for malpractice would be: patients would be relieved of the burden and cost
of proving malpractice in those cases where there would have been liability in
tort under the old system; they would receive prompt and presumably simple payment
instead of payment after possibly long delay; where disclosure to the patient of the
right to compensation is mandatory, those patients who, under the existing system are
entitled to compensation but for one reason or another fail to make claims would now
be compensated; and finally those persons who are not currently entitled to compen-
sation would be compensated under the no-fault system. For a discussion of analogous
problems under no-fault automobile legislation, see Bishop, The Validity Under the
Constitution of the United States of Basic Protection Insurance and Similar Proposals
for the Reform of the System of Compensating Victims of Automobile Accidents,
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY, CON-
STITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REFORM 35 (1970).
109. The creators of MAI recommend that there be a statutory obligation to inform
the patient of the existence of a claim and that the provider have personal liability for
failure to do so. In addition, they propose that providers who wilfully withhold in-
formation lose their immunity from tort liability for that injury. See Havighurst &
Tancredi, supra note 49, at 73. See also the Kennedy-Inouye Bill, S. 215, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 1705(c) (2) (1975). Neither of these proposals, however, deals directly




a mandatory system. 110 Legislation would prescribe the injuries to be
compensable in the event the option to participate in the system is exer-
cised. An enabling statute should also specify whether the patient's par-
ticipation in the system will constitute a complete waiver of the common
law cause of action for malpractice or only a waiver as to those injuries
that are compensable. 111 Possibly even a dual listing of compensable
events, one more extensive than the other, could be constructed. Elec-
tion to participate in the extensive coverage system might require a
complete waiver of the cause of action for malpractice, whereas partici-
pation in the less extensive system might require waiver only as to those
events covered. In addition, an enabling statute should specify the con-
ditions under which the election to participate would be valid. These
would include the requirement that the nature of the system be explained
to the patient so that he understands its operation, as well as (perhaps)
a right to revoke within a specified period.
An "elective" system need not grant an option to participate to
both the patient and health care provider." 2 Rather, participation could
be mandatory for patients upon the provider's election to provide no-
fault compensation in conformity with the statutory requirements. This
system would be elective from the health care provider's point of view
but not from the patient's. Legislation structuring an option in this
fashion should address several other issues. If the health care provider
may elect to provide no-fault coverage, must this election cover all his
patients? A universal election would allow patients to "physician shop"
so as to choose the kind of coverage they desire. This approach might
also induce physicians to decline to treat patients suffering from con-
ditions having a higher than average probability of resulting in a com-
110. For proposals that envision this method of instituting the system, see Havig-
burst, supra note 89, at 1278; O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Statute, 1975
INs. L.J. 261.
111. See note 108 supra.
112. The proposals vary in this respect. Under Professor O'Connell's plan,
whether or not the no-fault system is legislatively authorized, both parties would
have the option to participate - i.e., mutual agreement would be necessary. See, e.g.,
O'Connell, An Alternative To Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insur-
ance For Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv. 501, 529 (1976); O'Connell,
Contracting For No-Fault Liability Insurance Covering Doctors and Hospitals, 36
M%. L. REv. 533 (1977). Professor Havighurst, on the other hand, now appears to
contemplate that the right of election to participate would be the health care provider's
alone. See Havighurst, supra note 89, at 1278 n.133. The "Kennedy-Inouye" Bill, while
granting the provider alone the right to participate, also grants the patient an analogous
option in allowing him, after injury, to elect to receive no-fault benefits in return
for waiving his right to institute a tort action. See S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1717
(1975). There appears to be no proposal that makes the health care provider's par-
ticipation mandatory upon the patient's advance election in favor of no-fault coverage.
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pensable event. If the statute requires that coverage, once elected by
the health care provider, be applied to all of a physician's patients, fees
could be adjusted to account for "high risk" patients. If, on the other
hand, coverage need not be universal, providers might be encouraged to
offer their patients the option of choosing no-fault or tort liability
coverage with the price for the medical services rendered varying ac-
cording to that choice.113
Alternatively, health care providers might be required to offer all
their patients the right to elect no-fault coverage. Legislative decisions
would also have to be made here. Should the health care provider be
allowed to influence the patient's choice of coverage by varying his
fees according to that choice or according to the patient's medical con-
dition? Distressing as this possibility may seem, severe price differ-
entials would be unlikely for a number of reasons: the possibility of a
tort action for abandoning a patient, the availability of peer-group re-
view, the ethical obligation to provide needed care," 4 and the difficulty
of predicting high risks on an individual basis.
The validity of the agreements is the major issue confronting
a no-fault compensation system created solely by contract between
health care providers and patients without statutory authorization.
Challenges based on the patient's competence to bind himself would
turn on the situation existing at the time of the agreement's execu-
tion, the patient's physical and mental condition being highly rele-
vant. Challenges based on the terms of the contract should also be
anticipated. Health care providers (or insurance companies) drafting
no-fault contracts would probably be inclined to exclude from the list of
compensable events those medical complications that are rarely the bases
of malpractice claims, while including complications that are often the
subject of litigation." 5 It is easy to visualize contracts being declared
unconscionable if they were to contain low compensation levels or lists
of compensable events heavily biased in favor of physicians."' More-
over, it is questionable whether the advisory committees of professional
and business people, which under Professor O'Connell's recommenda-
tion would work with state insurance commissioners as part of the
113. See R. Rosett, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, (paper presented
to the Maryland Conference, supra note 6).
114. See Havighurst, supra note 89, at 1267-68.
115. See id. at 1276.
116. For the argument that such contracts should not be held unconscionable, see
O'Connell, An Alternative To Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insur-
ance For Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv. 501, 529-37 (1976); O'Connell,
Contracting For No-Fault Liability Insurance Covering Doctors and Hospitals, 36
MD. L. REv. 533 (1977).
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regulatory process, would exert sufficient influence to guarantee the
creation of equitable agreements."' In short, although it seems possible
for a no-fault system to be instituted without legislative authorization,
the risks of this approach make it unlikely that the strong support from
the insurance industry and from health care providers necessary to
operate it on a large scale can be enlisted.
4) Administration of the System. None of the existing proposals
has yet discussed the means of making a no-fault compensation system
operational. Much of the thinking about implementation can profitably
be delayed until agreement on the basic features of the system is reached.
Nevertheless, it may be useful to note that matters easily dismissed as
"mechanics" may surface later as significant obstacles in the adminis-
tration of the system. For example, unless health care providers bear
the burden of evaluating the condition of patients they treat and of
disclosing the occurrence of compensable events, a second tier of experts
(probably physicians) will be necessary to examine and advise patients
of their rights. Unless the patient's condition before and during treat-
ment is accurately documented, this second-tier evaluation system may
be unable to determine whether a compensable event has occurred, and
the gap between the right of compensation and the actual receipt of it,
which exists in the current system, will reappear. If there is no obliga-
tion to disclose and the relatively impartial second-tier evaluation is
unavailable, recourse to an attorney or some patient-advocate, with all
the additional costs of such assistance, may be necessary.
Although mandatory disclosure of compensable events may impose
rather simple (though irritating) obligations on physicians providing
office treatment, operation of a disclosure system could prove more
complicated for hospitals. Formal responsibility will have to be allo-
cated for the maintenance of records that are sufficiently detailed to
reflect the occurrence or nonoccurrence of compensable events, for the
evaluation of patients to determine these occurrences, and for the dis-
closure of the right to compensation. If no-fault coverage is not manda-
tory, some centralized system for determining which patients are en-
titled to disclosure would probably also be necessary. Although these
mechanisms can be achieved, they may entail substantial administrative
reorganization in some institutions.
A final problem that might arise in a nonmandatory system per-
tains to claims against multiple parties for the same injury. It is prob-
ably sufficient at this stage to suggest that when each of the health
117. See O'Connell, An Alternative To Abandoning Tort Liability: No-Fault
Liability Insurance For Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MiNN. L. REv. 501, 543 (1976).
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care providers is a participant in the no-fault system, allocation of re-
sponsibility should be based on a determination of which party is the
"cheapest cost-avoider."" 8 But where no-fault coverage is optional for
each provider, more serious questions of contribution among the par-
ties and implied waiver of the patients' claims in tort may arise. What
should be the rights of the parties when the patient has a no-fault
agreement with his surgeon but not with the hospital? Should a pro-
vision in the no-fault contract with the surgeon relieve the hospital of
its tort liability if the "cause" of the subsequent injury is unclear?
Should legislatures address these questions or leave them to market
determination? The answers to these questions are not crucial to the
theory of no-fault compensation, but the issues that the questions raise
must eventually be addressed in assessing the feasibility of such systems.
CONCLUSION
Medical malpractice reform involves a curious relationship be-
tween price and principle. On the one hand, it is necessary to ask
whether we can afford to pay for the objectives sought by some reforms.
On the other, we must ask whether cost savings are worth the prin-
ciples that must be sacrificed in order to achieve the savings. A legal
system with goals as "mixed" as ours will inevitably be forced to make
such decisions based as much on calculations of marginal benefit as on
clearly posed choices among conflicting values. Medical malpractice
reform is no exception. The process has been made especially difficult,
however, by the dearth of definitive data, by the pressure for action,
and by the absence of commonly held notions concerning the nature
of the problems to be addressed. Only as the character of the choices
available and their probable outcomes become more clearly understood
is there likely to be any consensus concerning the proper approaches for
resolving the medical malpractice "problem." In the meantime, we can
expect continued experimentation with a variety of approaches.
118. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 49, at 79-80.
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